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Abstract:   Just as equality of opportunity becomes an increasingly prominent concept 
in normative economics, we argue that it is also a relevant concept for positive models of 
the links between distribution and aggregate efficiency. Persuasive microeconomic 
evidence suggests that inequalities in wealth, power and status have efficiency costs. 
These variables capture different aspects of people’s opportunity sets, for which observed 
income may be a poor proxy. One implication is that the cross-country literature on 
income inequality and growth may have been barking up the wrong tree, and that 
alternative measures of the relevant distributions are needed. This paper reviews some of 
the detailed microeconomic evidence, and then suggests three research areas where 
further work is needed. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Two relatively recent developments in thinking about distribution in economics, which 
have remained largely unrelated so far, ought to be much more closely connected. The 
first is the acknowledgement that distribution – in particular the distribution of wealth – 
may affect aggregate outcomes, such as the overall level of output, or its rate of growth. 
This had of course been a theme of classical economists, who intuitively understood the 
importance of distribution in political economy. It has also been recognized more 
recently, as in Nicholas Kaldor’s view that the poor and the rich have different savings 
rates. Kaldor (1956) hypothesized that increases in income inequality today could lead to 
greater prosperity tomorrow, by increasing the average savings rate from a given amount 
of output. 
 
But distributional considerations had been peripheral to mainstream neo-classical 
economics until the early 1990s, when a series of important papers suggested that, if 
credit and insurance markets were imperfect, the distribution of wealth might matter for 
the level and composition of aggregate investment, and hence to total output levels (e.g. 
Galor and Zeira, 1993). Different initial wealth distributions could also affect 
occupational choice and, through its impact on the relative supply of and demand for 
labor, determine wage trajectories and aggregate development paths (Banerjee and 
Newman, 1993). A variety of other mechanisms through which unequal wealth 
distributions could reduce economic efficiency when capital markets are imperfect were 
proposed.
3 The result was, as Atkinson (1997) put it, to “bring income distribution in 
from the cold” (p.297).  
 
In a separate strand of work, it was also suggested that politics could be another channel 
through which distribution affected outcomes. If governments were not benevolent 
dictators, but instead represented the (possibly conflicting) interests of different groups in 
society, then the expected distributional outcomes of different policies (such as tax rates, 
or public expenditure decisions) would feature in the public decisions about them. The 
implication was that policies actually chosen and implemented need not be optimal from 
a social point of view. They might instead be optimal from the private point of view of 
the pivotal voter, dominant group, or government agent that makes the decision. To the 
extent that wealth (or income) affects either the individual’s preference for different 
policy alternatives, or his power in influencing the ultimate government choice (or both), 
the distribution of wealth may affect the choice of policies, and hence the degree of the 
resulting inefficiency. 
 
Early models of these policy decisions in a median-voter framework included Alesina 
and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994). Later, the interaction between 
political economy mechanisms and capital market imperfections allowed for an even 
richer set of possible outcomes, including one in which unequal wealth leads to inequality 
in political power and, consequently, to inefficiently low levels of redistribution. 
Plausible models exist in which such reinforcement between economic and political 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Aghion and Bolton (1997), Piketty (1997) and Aghion et al. (1999).   3
inequalities might lead to multiple equilibria, with some featuring higher inequality  and 
lower output levels than others.
4  
 
The second development in thinking about distribution preceded these models of 
distribution and aggregate outcomes, and took place in the areas of public choice, welfare 
economics and theories of social justice - along the frontier between economics and 
philosophy. It consisted of a move away from ex-post realizations – such as  incomes and 
utilities – and towards ex-ante potentials as the appropriate metrics for social welfare, or 
as the appropriate spaces in which to judge the fairness of a given allocation or system,. 
John Rawls (1971) may have been the pioneer in this essentially normative (and highly 
influential) literature, but he was soon joined by others such as Ronald Dworkin (1981), 
Amartya Sen (1985), G. A. Cohen (1989) and John Roemer (1998). As the very titles of 
some of their most important contributions indicate, these authors were concerned with 
the space in which one should seek to measure, understand and influence distribution.
5  
 
Although each author was different in important respects, the thrust of their efforts 
begins, with the passage of time, to seem similar in essence. Rawls’s “Difference 
Principle” sought to maximize the availability of primary goods to the least privileged 
group; Sen wrote about capabilities
6; Dworkin spoke of equality of resources; and 
Roemer emphasized equality of opportunities. While a number of worthy treatises have 
been written on the subtle distinctions between these different normative approaches, a 
broad common tendency can be identified in this evolution in the theory of social justice 
over the last three decades or so. And that is the movement away from actual ex-post 
outcomes (such as incomes) and their effects on the well-being of the individual (such as 
utilities), towards sets of potential outcomes, ex-ante (such as capabilities or 
opportunities). 
 
We argue that these two separate developments in thinking, in two apparently remote 
areas of economics, should not remain unconnected. The reason is that inequality in 
opportunity – in addition to being an arguably superior concept on which to anchor the 
normative evaluation of alternative social states – may well turn out to be precisely the 
right concept for the empirical testing of theoretical hypotheses about how distribution 
affects aggregate efficiency and growth.  
 
Most models that propose links between distribution and aggregate levels of output do 
not actually refer to income distributions. The key concept is usually the distribution of 
wealth (as in Galor and Zeira, 1993, and Banerjee and Newman, 1993) and, crucially, the 
extent to which, under imperfect capital markets, wealth levels may affect the set of 
feasible  investment opportunities (or occupational choices). If education is a lumpy 
investment process with fixed costs, then those who are “too poor” may not have the 
opportunity to invest, despite the fact that returns may be high and that the investment 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Bénabou (2000) and Ferreira (2001). 
5 A number of papers echoed Amartya Sen’s (1980) Tanner Lecture on Human Values, which was entitled 
“Equality of What?”. 
6 Sen defines a person’s capabilities as the set of all possible functionings – actions and states of being – 
that a person can choose from.   4
would have been undertaken if the credit market were perfect. Entrepreneurship may be a 
preferable occupation to being a wage laborer but again, if there are non-convexities in 
production and imperfections in credit markets, then the poor may not have that option, 
regardless of ability. If wealth and ability both determine the allocation of students to the 
best schools or colleges, then it will not be the ablest students who attend the best schools 
(Fernández and Gali, 1999). 
 
The models are, therefore, fundamentally about the distribution of opportunities. 
Inefficiencies arise because the people who seize the opportunities (for education, 
investment, or entrepreneurship) are neither as many nor the same individuals as would 
have been the case if markets worked perfectly. Aggregate output is lower because 
capital ends up being invested at lower marginal returns by some richer investors, rather 
than at higher returns by credit-constrained ones. Or because dumb children from rich 
families have the chance to attend good schools, while clever children from poor families 
do not – and then go to schools with no teachers or simply drop out.  
 
Think a little bit more broadly about opportunities, and the same logic begins to apply to 
the political economy models. That class of ideas revolves around power. The same 
distribution of wealth can generate very different economic outcomes – some efficient, 
some not – under different assumptions mapping wealth to political power (Ferreira, 
2001). If one is prepared to think of a person’s – or group’s – ability to influence political 
decisions in his community as part of his opportunity set, then the political economy 
channel between inequality and efficiency (or growth) is also fundamentally about the 
inequality of opportunities. The empirical implications should be clear: if institutional 
set-ups (including the relative freedom of the press, the independence of the judicial 
system, and the transparency of the campaign finance system) differ across societies, the 
same degree of wealth inequality should lead to different aggregate efficiency outcomes. 
It all depends on the mapping between economic wealth and political power. 
 
There may, therefore, be a coincidence between the normative concept towards which 
philosophers have been gravitating as a defining feature of the just society, and the 
positive concept of which greater equality may imply greater efficiency. It was the 
possibility of this remarkable convergence that motivated the World Bank’s 2006 World 
Development Report’s focus on equity and development. 
 
In what follows, we sketch some of the arguments that the Report presents in greater 
detail. In Section 2 we present some evidence that morally irrelevant predetermined 
circumstances – i.e. factors over which individuals have no control, and which society 
deems to be irrelevant in terms of their deserts – do in fact powerfully affect outcomes. 
Following Roemer (1998), we interpret these effects as prima-facie evidence of the 
existence of inequality in opportunities. Section 3 argues that the existence of these 
inequalities in opportunity hold back development – through many of the mechanisms 
suggested in the theoretical literature, and in some other ways too. Section 4 considers 
some implications of the analysis, both for policy and further research.  
 
   5
2.  Pre-determined circumstances shape lives 
 
Opportunity sets begin taking form in utero. Who one’s parents are, what country they 
live in, and how rich they are make a great deal of difference for a person’s opportunities. 
The opportunity to life itself turns out to depend on such pre-determined circumstances as 
the education and wealth of parents, whether their house has access to clean water and 
sanitation, and how close it is to medical treatment. Consider Figure 1, which plots 
group-specific infant mortality rates across countries. Each vertical line in the figure 
corresponds to one country, and within each country, the highest point in the line 
indicates infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) among children whose mothers have no 
education, while the lowest point gives the corresponding figure for those whose mothers 
have completed secondary schooling or higher. The differences are striking, not only 
across countries, but perhaps even more so within them. In El Salvador, for instance, 
babies born to mothers with no schooling are four times as likely to die before their first 
birthday as their counterparts with better educated mothers. 
 













































































































Source: World Development Report 2006, from Demographic Health Survey (DHS) data. 
Note: The continuous dark line represents the mean infant mortality rate in each country, while the 
endpoints of the whiskers indicate the infant mortality rates by different levels of mother’s education. 
 
Parental education is not, unfortunately, the only predetermined circumstance that affects 
the basic opportunity for life. There is some evidence that gender does too, at least in 
parts of Asia, where juvenile sex ratios are unusually high. A juvenile sex-ratio simply 
measures the number of 0-4 year-old boys in a population, relative to the number of 0-4 
year-old girls. Because slightly more boys than girls are born in a typical population at 
any given time, that ratio oscillates between 1.00 and 1.05 in most countries. 
Remarkably, in the Indian states of Punjab and Haryana, the 2001 ratio was above 1.20. 
In China, it reached 1.17 in 2000. While some recent work suggests that the patterns of 
incidence of hepatitis B – and the fact that it leads to more male births – may account for   6
some of these differences (see Oster, 2005), the dominant view is that this unusual 
discrepancy reflects son-preference in these societies, implemented through selective 
abortion and post-natal care (see Sen,1990, and Klasen and Wink, 2003).  
 
Opportunities continue to depend on morally irrelevant, predetermined circumstances 
even if you survive your first year. Access to basic health care, such as immunization 
services, is strongly correlated with parental wealth (Figure 2). Even a child’s cognitive 
skills seem to develop at different rates depending on family background, for children as 
young as 3-5 years old. Figure 3, drawn from Paxson and Schady (2004), shows the 
evolution of vocabulary recognition test scores (TVIP) for two groups of children from 
Ecuador: those whose parents have 0-5 years of schooling, and those whose parents have 
12 or more years of schooling. By the time these children enter primary school, at age 6, 


















































































Source: World Development Report 2006, from Demographic Health Survey (DHS) data. 
Note: The continuous dark line represents the percentage of children without access to a basic 
immunization package in each country, while the endpoints of the whiskers indicate the percentages for the 
top and the bottom quintile of the asset ownership distribution. 
* Indicates that the poorest quintile have higher access to childhood immunization services than the 
wealthiest quintile. 
These statistical associations do not establish causality, of course. While endogeneity 
should not be a concern in the associations presented above – because access to 
immunization rates or child mortality today can not cause parental education decades 
earlier – omitted variables clearly exist. The descriptions presented above are essentially   7
bivariate correlations. They do not establish the effect of, say, parental education on 
vocabulary recognition, or immunization. Parental education is obviously correlated with 
wealth, housing quality, access to water, distance to and quality of school, and possibly 
even with genetic endowments of ability that can be transmitted across generations. 
There is an important literature that seeks to identify each of these individual effects,
7 and 
it is clear that the simple patterns we describe here do not do so. What they do is suggest 
that the collection of these pre-determined circumstance variables (parental education, 
wealth, location, access to services, etc.), which can not be controlled by the infant or 
young child, do powerfully shape his or her choice – or opportunity – set.  
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Source: Paxson and Schady, 2004. 
 
 
3.  Unequal opportunities hold back development – in a number of ways. 
 
The fact that predetermined, morally irrelevant circumstances influence opportunities, 
and therefore final outcomes, was all that mattered to the second strand of thinking 
mentioned in the Introduction. A normative consensus – or at least some degree of 
convergence – was emerging, that judged such inequality of opportunities to be ethically 
undesirable, from the point of view of social justice. In this section, we argue that it is 
exactly this sort of inequality – inequality in the predetermined circumstances that shape 
opportunities – that leads to aggregate inefficiency, in the spirit of the first strand of 
thinking previously summarized. Consider three telling examples. 
 
The first example is from an agricultural setting in Ghana, where land is allocated by 
custom, and security of property rights is therefore often linked to the local power 
structure. Goldstein and Udry (2002) find that individuals are less likely to leave their 
land fallow (an investment in long-run productivity of the land) if they do not hold a 
                                                 
7 See Card (2001) for a survey.   8
position of power within either the hierarchy of the village or the hierarchy of the lineage. 
The problem is that the land may get taken away from those with little influence when it 
is lying fallow. Because women rarely hold these positions of power, women’s land is not 
left fallow enough and is much less productive than men’s. This land gets degraded 
because women do not have the social status needed to hold on to it during the fallowing 
period.  The key point for our argument is that the resulting decline in land productivity is 
a pure loss for society. The fact that other people do have status and can fallow their land 
as needed does not, in any way, compensate for the loss of productivity on the land of the 
powerless.   
A separate study by the same authors (and in the same country) provides a second 
example of how unequal opportunities that arise from the interaction between poverty 
and imperfect or missing markets leads directly to inefficiency. In the forest-savannah in 
Southern Ghana, cocoa cultivation, receding for many years because of the swollen shoot 
disease, has been replaced by a cassava-maize intercrop.  Recently, however, pineapple 
cultivation for export to Europe offered a new opportunity for farmers in this area.  In 
1997 and 1998 more than 200 households cultivating 1,070 plots in four clusters in this 
area were surveyed every six weeks for about two years.  The survey results reveal that 
the profitability of pineapple production dominates that of the traditional intercrop (figure 
4).
8 The average returns associated with switching from the traditional maize and cassava 
intercrops to pineapple is estimated to be in excess of 1,200 percent! Yet only 190 out of 
1,070 plots were used for pineapple.  When the authors asked farmers why they were not 
farming pineapple, the virtually unanimous response was: “I don’t have the money”.
9 
While it is true that some heterogeneity in ability between those who have switched to 
pineapple and those who have not cannot be entirely ruled out, the authors conclude that 
the fixed costs involved in switching crops (combined with imperfect credit and 
insurance markets) prevent a large number of farmers from making a very profitable 
investment. Output and income levels in these areas is correspondingly below potential. 
                                                 
8 From Goldstein and Udry (1999), figure 4. 
9 From Goldstein and Udry (1999), 38.   9



























































0 20 40 60 80 100
cumulative percent of plots
pineapple profits non-pineapple profits
 
Source: Goldstein and Udry (1999). 
 
A final example comes from the impact of belonging to a low caste on individual 
performance. To examine the effect of stereotypes on the ability of individuals to respond 
to economic incentives, Hoff and Pandey (2004) undertook experiments with low- and 
high-caste children in rural north India.  The caste system in India can be described as a 
highly stratified social hierarchy in which groups of individuals are invested with 
different social status and social meaning. 
In the first experiment, groups composed of three low-caste (“dalits”) and three high-
caste junior high school students were asked to solve mazes and were paid based on the 
number of mazes they solved.  In one condition, no personal information about the 
participants was announced.  In a second condition, caste was announced with each 
participant’s name and village.  In a third condition, participants were segregated by caste 
and then each participant’s name, village, and caste were announced in the six-person 
group. 
When caste was not announced, there was no caste gap in performance (figure 5).  But 
increasing the salience of caste led to a significant decline in the average performance of 
the low caste, regardless of whether the payment scheme was piece rate (that is, 
participants were paid 1 rupee per maze solved) or tournament (that is, the participant 
who solved the most mazes was paid 6 rupees per maze solved; the other participants 
received nothing).  When caste was announced, the low-caste children solved 25 percent 
fewer mazes on average in the piece-rate treatments, compared with the performance of 
subjects when caste was not announced.  When caste was announced and groups were 
composed of six children drawn from only the low caste (a pattern of segregation that for 
the low caste implicitly evokes their traditional outcast status), the decline in low-caste 
performance was even greater. While we cannot be sure from these data what the   10
children were thinking, some combination of loss of self-confidence and expectation of 
prejudicial treatment likely explains the result. 
Figure 5 Children’s performance differs when their caste is made public 
 
Source:  Hoff and Pandey (2004). 
Note: A vertical line in the figure illustrates the statistically significant caste gaps. 
 
The expectation by the low-caste subjects of prejudicial treatment may be rational given 
the discrimination in their villages. But the discrimination itself may not be fully rational.  
Cognitive limitations may prevent others from judging stigmatized individuals fairly.   
The fact that people are bounded in their ability to process information creates broad 
scope for belief systems—in which some social groups are viewed as innately inferior to 
others—to influence economic behavior. If such beliefs persist, it will generally be 
rational for those discriminated against to under-invest (with respect to others) in the 
accumulation of skills for which the return is likely to be lower for them.   
 
The three examples above illustrate a growing body of microeconomic evidence of the 
inefficiency of inequality.
10 One case – that of Ghanaian farmers unable to switch from 
cassava and maize to pineapple – exemplifies the classic interaction between fixed costs, 
poverty and a missing credit market. Farmers were too poor to be able to pay the fixed 
costs required for making the switch. If a perfect credit market existed, they would have 
been able to borrow against the large expected returns of switching, to finance the 
investment. Market imperfections and a mass of poor people at the bottom of the 
distribution lead to missed opportunities and X-inefficiency. 
 
But the other two examples are different. The Indian children who solve fewer mazes 
when they are explicitly reminded of their inferior social status do not require any 
markets that might be missing or imperfect. Yet, in a convincing experimental setting, 
their productivity is reduced by the mere existence of the social hierarchy. If similar 
declines in productivity occur in real work situations, the private and social losses would 
                                                 
10 To paraphrase the title of Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (2003): “The Injustice of Inequality”. 
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be no less important. The Ghanaian women farmers who cannot adequately fallow their 
land, leading to losses in its productivity, are similarly not suffering from poverty 
combined with missing markets. The channel here is an inequality in power, when 
effective property rights are power-dependent. What all three situations have in common 
is that differences in wealth, power or status generate unequal opportunities for 
productive investment. In all cases, these inequalities cause society to remain shy of the 
Pareto frontier. 
 
A concern with these mechanisms is particularly justified because of the evidence that 
unequal productive opportunities persist across generations, over long periods of time. 
The World Development Report 2006 highlights two broad mechanisms through which 
inequalities are reproduced – leading to what it calls inequality traps. One is the simple 
fact that many of an adult’s outcomes (such as his education and wealth levels, or where 
he lives) will be his children’s pre-determined circumstances. If the child’s outcomes are 
affected by the circumstances, the ingredients for intergenerational persistence are 
present. And in fact, a growing literature on intergenerational mobility (or the lack 
thereof) has documented the impact of parental background on achievement, and the 
degree of transmission of status across generations. In the US, Mazumder (2005) finds an 
intergenerational earnings elasticity of 0.6, implying that a family currently earning half 
the national average income can expect to take five generations to reach the average.
11 
Estimates for developing countries are few and far between, but can be even higher. 
Dunn (2003) estimated an elasticity of 0.69 for Brazil. 
 
The second mechanism for the persistence of inequalities is institutional endogeneity. 
Since Douglas North and Oliver Williamson modern economists have understood that the 
manner in which individuals and firms interact in markets is conditioned by the nature of 
non-market institutions – formal and informal rules and norms of behavior, and the 
agencies that enforce them. Among the most important roles of these non-market 
institutions are the definition and enforcement of property rights and contracts.  People 
will not invest if property rights are not well defined and enforced, or if they believe that 
the contracts they write will not be honored. The state must also provide a whole set of 
other inputs apart from social order and fair contract enforcement.  These include various 
types of public services and regulations. Lying behind well-functioning markets are legal 
systems, judges, policemen, and, ultimately, social groups and politicians.   
But institutions, like policies, are not designed by a benevolent dictator. They evolve over 
time in response to the actions of individuals and groups who seek to protect their own 
interests. It follows that institutions – again just like policies – need not be optimal from a 
social viewpoint. It is perfectly possible that the institutions that are best-suited to the 
short-term interests of a particular group in a particular generation are not those most 
conducive to broad-based economic growth and development. If that particular group 
                                                 
11 Mazumder’s estimate is considerably higher than previous estimates (of around 0.4). See, e.g. Solon 
(1992). The difference arises mainly from the author’s use of a long-term social security earnings history of 
fathers and children, which allows him to reduce the variance of the transitory component of incomes 
inherent in previous measures of father’s economic status, usually drawn from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) or from the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS).   12
happens to be very powerful, however, it is also possible that those institutions end up 
prevailing, despite not being the best ones for growth and development. 
The World Development Report 2006 discusses a number of examples, both historical 
and contemporary, of different institutional developments that appear to have been driven 
by different degrees of political and economic inequality. One revealing comparison – 
which draws on work by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), and Engerman and 
Sokoloff (1997) – is that between European colonies in North and South America. Those 
colonies, such as present-day Mexico, Peru or Brazil, where initial factor endowments 
enabled the colonizers to establish extractive institutions based on highly-concentrated 
property and control structures (such as the encomienda and mita  systems used, for 
example, in the Andean silver mines; or the capitanias hereditárias in northeastern 
Brazil), tended to do less well in the long-run than those colonial backwaters, such as 
present-day Canada and northern United States, where conditions were not ripe for 
producing any of the day’s most desirable commodities, such as gold, silver, or sugar.  
In these places, instead of imposing concentrated patterns of land ownership and 
indentured or slave labor institutions, colonists were left to their own devices. The 
absence of large native populations (who could be exploited and dispossessed) or slaves 
(who were not imported, since soils and climates were not suitable for the crops that 
would justify the investment) meant that free populations of European descendants were 
soon in the majority. Rather than making rules designed to prevent the exploited native 
(or enslaved) masses from sharing in prosperity, these colonists soon demanded greater 
autonomy in decision making. Because population density was low and there was no way 
to extract resources from indigenous peoples, early commercial developments in Canada 
and the United States had to import British labor.  And, relative to much of the colonial 
world, the disease environment was benign, stimulating settlement.  Indeed, the Pilgrim 
fathers decided to migrate to the United States rather than Guyana because of the high 
mortality rates in Guyana.
12  Limited supplies of labor gave workers a greater bargaining 
power, forcing elites to extend political rights and create equal access to land and the law.   
The World Development Report 2006, following Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001) and Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), argues that these initial institutional 
differences between North and South American colonies have persisted for centuries, and 
led to important differences in economic outcomes between the two sets of countries. The 
argument is that institutions that rely on a high concentration of property and control over 
resources, and that lead to limited opportunities for investment and innovation for large 
segments of the population, are less efficient. Because talent and ideas are widely 
distributed in the population, economies in which the property of all people is secure and 
in which there is equality before the law for all, rather than just for some, tend to do 
better. Similarly, political systems that provide access to services and public goods for all 




                                                 
12 See Crosby (1986), 143–44.   13
4.  Policy and Research Implications 
 
The thesis of this paper is that inequality of opportunity, which has gained prominence in 
modern normative thinking about social justice, is also a highly relevant concept for 
understanding the positive links between distribution and efficiency. Wealth inequalities 
(combined with market imperfections), inequalities in power, and status differences have 
all been shown to lead to inefficiency, in a number of different contexts. It has also been 
argued, prominently and plausibly, that large inequalities in power and wealth can lead to 
institutional characteristics that are associated with lower subsequent growth. 
 
The broad implication for public action is that the effects of any policy on the distribution 
of opportunities will in general have an impact on aggregate efficiency, which needs to 
be taken into account in any assessment or evaluation of the policy. In some cases, the 
impact may be direct, and relatively simple to measure. Building a road that connects a 
poor and geographically isolated area to markets may increase profit margins on sales of 
its produce and lower the costs of consumption goods in (possibly) measurable ways. In 
many other cases, however, measuring the efficiency gain from redistributing 
opportunities is much harder. How does one quantify the savings from ethnic conflicts 
avoided by a (hypothetically) successful integration or affirmative action program? How 
long must one wait until the full benefits of educating girls today shows up in their 
children’s opportunities in the future? 
 
We return to these measurement and long-term evaluation challenges below. 
Conceptually, however, the general point is that if highly unequal opportunities generate 
inefficiencies, then reductions in these inequalities may well be efficient. Ignoring the full 
long-run benefits (costs) of any reductions (increases) in inequality of opportunity will 
therefore generally result in an under-provision of efficient redistribution.
13 
 
The World Development Report 2006 discusses implications of this general point in 
considerable detail, and for a variety of policy areas. The lasting impact of early 
childhood nutrition and mental development on subsequent opportunities implies that the 
pay-offs to investment in early human development programs are likely to be large. The 
imperfections of insurance markets imply that the existence of appropriate social security 
systems can enable efficient (but riskier) investment decisions to be made. 
Complementarity between infrastructure and private capital often argues for an expansion 
of access to the poorest groups. Market rules and institutions are often skewed towards 
more powerful groups, sometimes generating substantial inefficiency in resource 
allocation.  
                                                 
13 The term ‘efficient redistribution’ has been used before. In one prominent discussion, Bowles and Gintis 
(1996) argued that a number of “asset-based” redistributions – including of property rights over firms to 
workers; over houses to tenants; of school vouchers to parents; and of parental income streams to children – 
would increase efficiency, by transferring residual rights of control over assets to those whose actions more 
directly affect asset use or maintenance. While there are very substantial differences between their detailed 
proposals and the World Development Report’s, there is also one basic broad similarity: both emphasize 
the potential for asset redistributions than enhance, rather than attenuate, productive incentives. Both 
approaches suggest that equity can and should be pursued in a market-friendly manner, with potentially 
large efficiency gains.   14
 
The report, which dedicates four chapters to these themes only briefly mentioned here, 
insists that appropriate policy recommendations can only be made with an adequate 
understanding of the local context. The question of whether the highest social return to a 
marginal dollar – even once the full benefits of equity are taken into account – accrues to 
improving the rural road network or expanding a conditional cash transfer scheme clearly 
cannot be answered in the abstract. The answer to any such question will surely depend 
on specific conditions in the country. In some cases, a priority for both efficiency and 
equity reasons will lie in reforming a captured and corrupt financial system. In others, it 
may be that the marginal dollar should be returned to the tax-payer, in the form of lower 
taxes. In others yet, the expected long-term returns on a publicly-funded expansion in 
basic health care may be so high, that taxes may need to rise. 
 
Such context specificity, while rather fashionable these days, has serious implications of 
its own for applied research. If the concept of opportunity sets, and the distribution of 
opportunities, really turn out to matter for development policy, considerable progress will 
be needed in their measurement. We close this paper with a suggestion of three areas 
where further applied research would be helpful, if policymakers are to be presented with 
evidence on the basis of which better-informed decisions can be made. 
 
Measurement of inequality of opportunities is surely one of them. If opportunities are 
perfectly correlated with incomes – or wealth – then clearly one just needs to measure 
those variables accurately. The hypothesis that is often proposed, however, is that the 
determinants of opportunity are many, so that the partial correlation with any one of them 
is imperfect. Wealth may very well affect opportunities but so, the argument goes, do 
race, disability, gender, caste, place of birth, etc. If that is so, can one compute acceptable 
summary indicators of this ex-ante set of potential outcomes? Initial attempts have been 
made, but the area is in its infancy, and more work is needed.
14  
 
Since inequality of opportunity is closer to the concept of distribution that is relevant to 
the theoretical literature on inequality and growth than income inequality, a related 
question is whether turning to such an indicator might shed light on the inconclusive 
empirical cross-country literature on the subject. While most cross-section regressions of 
growth on initial income inequality (with controls) have returned negative and significant 
coefficients on inequality, most panel regressions of growth on lagged, time-varying 
income inequality (with controls) have returned positive and significant coefficients.
15 If 
we were able to measure inequality of opportunity directly for a number of countries, so 
that one no longer needed to rely on income inequality as a proxy, would the cross-
country result shed light on the ‘macroeconomic’ effect that corresponds to the micro-
economic impacts identified through studies such as those discussed in Section 3? The 
question remains open. 
 
                                                 
14 See Bourguignon, Ferreira and Menéndez (2003), Cogneau and Gignoux (2005) and O’Neill, Sweetman 
and Van de Gaer (2000). 
15 See Bénabou (1996) for a survey of the cross-section results, Forbes (2000) and Li and Zou (1998) for 
two influential panel studies, and Banerjee and Duflo (2003) for a possible interpretation of the differences.   15
Long-term evaluation of projects and policies aimed at greater equality of opportunities 
is a second policy-relevant area where the current stock of knowledge is insufficient. The 
World Development Report suggests, in a number of instances, that returns on some 
investments in the opportunity-poor may suffer from a considerable delay. The impact of 
better nutrition for expecting mothers may not show up until today’s fetus becomes an 
adult. Gains from reduced ethnic conflict that may follow from investments in poor 
ethnic minorities today may accrue decades into the future. And so on. However difficult 
properly evaluating impacts over extended periods of time may be, attempts would have 
to be made, unless policy-makers are expected to take such benefits on pure faith.
16 
 
A related question is that of quantifying the costs and benefits. It has long been 
understood that policy choices depend not only on a careful identification of impact, but 
on a relative quantification of the costs and benefits of individual projects, relative to 
alternatives. The difficulties are many, but it is somewhat unfortunate that the basic 
insights from the literature on cost-benefit analysis - from Little and Mirrlees (1969) and 
Drèze and Stern (1987), for instance - are so unfashionable these days. However 
unglamorous such estimations may appear to contemporary journal editors, there is likely 
to be substantial policy payoff from combining the much improved techniques for 
measuring impact (from experimental and matching methods), with a preoccupation to 
value their costs and benefits. 
 
The link between equal opportunities (or equity more broadly) and institutional quality is 
the third area where current knowledge is insufficient. While the historical evidence 
presented by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Engerman and Sokoloff 
(1997) is persuasive, it falls short of nailing down the precise mechanisms through which 
equity affects institutions in ways that are relevant to current policy design. The 
arguments are plausible, but more – and different categories of – evidence is needed.  
This is likely to require research that can both identify the determinants of institutional 
differences, and document the processes at work. One approach is to look for cases of 
natural experiments that allow for the identification of causal effects. Two studies from 
India provide examples of work that seeks to capture causal influences: Banerjee, Gertler 
and Ghatak (2002) examine tenancy reform in West Bengal; and Besley et al. (2004) 
analyze the effects of changes in the rules of local democracy (that increase 
representation of scheduled castes and tribes in village governments) on the provision of 
public goods.  In this category of research, it will be important to link with the large 
tradition of political science, sociological and ethnographic work to understand the 
processes at work. 
 
One area of particular interest is research that can link an understanding of institutions to 
core concepts and approaches of economics: a promising avenue in experimental 
economics is the use of laboratory experiments in which subjects play variants of a same 
basic game, with controlled changes in rules (institutions). One interesting example is the 
Repeated Public Good Game, in which individuals must decide whether to keep their 
                                                 
16 The difficulties in carrying out even well-designed experimental evaluations over a long period are 
illustrated by a recent medium-term evaluation of student achievement following the PROGRESA (now 
Oportunidades) program (see Behrman, Parker and Todd, 2005).   16
money (at zero returns), or invest it in a common project with high returns. Rates are set 
such that the highest returns to all players are attained when all invest 100% in the 
common project, but the dominant strategy for each individual player is to try to free-ride 
on others: not to invest one’s own resources, but seek to benefit from the high returns in 
the common pot.  Fehr and Gachter (2000) find that actual behavior in the game differs 
substantially depending on whether punishment (expending real resources to punish non-
cooperative behavior) is allowed or not. When punishment is permitted, even a small 
number of altruistic players can sustain a cooperative (and Pareto-superior) equilibrium. 
While in this example institutions are exogenous, and one investigates their effects on 
outcomes, it might be possible to design experiments where rules are endogenous, and 
where the distribution of endowments changes.
17 
 
As research on these different fronts evolves, we may learn more about the nature and 
extent of redistributive activity that governments should seek to pursue, even if they are 
concerned exclusively with dynamic efficiency. Normative considerations will always 
remain important, and they are additional to these insights. Such an agenda would 
complement the substantial evidence already presented in WDR 2006 about the extent of 
the inequality of opportunity that exists today, both within and between countries, and 
about its impact on investment and institutions. 
 
 
                                                 
17 Other research strategies are evidently also possible, including detailed case studies of how particular 
institutions develop, or looking for governments, national or local, willing to conduct “institutional 
experiments”.   17
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